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KEY FINDINGS: 
 
 
• Increasing the minimum wage 
has the potential to benefit a 
sizeable number of people whose 
wages would otherwise remain 
stuck at very low levels; 
however, decreases in overall 
employment or an increased 
incentive to choose work over 
education may offset these gains 
for some groups.  
 
 
• Union members typically enjoy 
higher wages than non-members, 
though their upward mobility 
over time is slower. The children 
of union members also tend to be 
at a slight advantage, as a portion 
of union wage gains, as well as 
union status itself, tend to 
transfer from one generation to 
the next.  
 
 
Labor market institutions like unions and minimum 
wage laws represent some of the most direct levers available to 
a policymaker with a mobility-focused agenda. Both have the 
potential to increase absolute mobility: minimum wage laws 
mandate that workers receive a slice of the economic pie, and 
unions give their members more leverage to bargain for 
increases in pay. At the same time, however, unions and 
minimum wage laws can lead to labor market rigidities that 
make it more difficult for people to move up the economic 
ladder. These rigidities can decrease relative mobility and, if 
they lead to outcomes like higher unemployment, can decrease 
absolute upward mobility as well. 
 
 
Unfortunately, relatively little is known about the relationship between these labor market 
institutions and intergenerational and intragenerational economic mobility. Though many 
studies of unions and minimum wage laws include tangential discussions of mobility, direct 
evidence is difficult to come by. To the extent that consensus exists in a sparse research arena, the 
following statements seem fair:  
 
 Increasing the minimum wage has the potential to benefit a sizeable number of people 
whose wages would otherwise remain stuck at very low levels; however, decreases in 
overall employment or an increased incentive to choose work over education may offset 
these gains for some groups.  
 Union members typically enjoy higher wages than non-members, though their upward 
mobility over time is slower. The children of union members also tend to be at a slight 
advantage, as a portion of union wage gains, as well as union status itself, tend to transfer 
from one generation to the next.  
 
The table below summarizes a few key papers that address the mobility consequences of 
unionization and minimum wage laws.  
 
Labor Market Institutions and Mobility 
Minimum Wage Laws 
 Intragenerational mobility 
 Minimum wage workers have roughly a 40 to 50 percent chance of moving up to a higher-
paying job in each of the first 10 years of their careers. Still, 15 percent of women and 16 
percent of blacks spend at least 5 out of those 10 years at jobs paying close to the minimum 
wage (Carrington and Fallick 2001).  
 Exposure to higher minimum wage levels at a young age decreases future earnings. For 
instance, each 10 percent increase in the minimum wage a 25- to 29-year-old experienced 
between the ages of 20 and 24 decreases his or her expected current earnings by 3.8 percent 
(Neumark and Nizalova 2004).  
Unionization 
  Intragenerational mobility 
 The wages of working-age men typically increase by 6 percent upon joining a union, with 
especially large gains for less-skilled workers (Card 1996).  
 For white men, union membership lowers the annual probability of promotion by between 23 
and 32 percent; not having a high school degree lowers that same probability by 37 to 48 
percent (McCue 1996)  
  Intergenerational mobility 
 Parents’ union membership positively affects wage, earnings, and educational outcomes for 
children in low-income families (Shea 1997). 
 
Studies relating changes in minimum wage and unionization levels to income and wage 
inequality are much more common. The reason for this is most likely practical: by definition, 
mobility can be measured only with longitudinal data, while assessments of economic inequality 
can rely on powerful cross-sectional datasets like the Current Population Survey. Standing on this 
fairly solid empirical ground, researchers today generally agree that declines in unionization and 
the real value of the minimum wage contributed substantially to the increase in wage inequality in 
the 1980s, but have had less of an impact in more recent years. The role played by labor market 
institutions in earnings and income inequality, however, is much less clear as shown in the table 
below.  
 
Labor Market Institutions and Economic Inequality  
Minimum Wage Laws 
 Decreases in the real minimum wage accounted for 20 to 30 percent of the increase in 
inequality between the late 1970s and the early 1990s (Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux 1996; 
Card and Krueger 1995, as cited in Morris and Western 1999). 
 Recent increases in inequality owe more to wage growth at the upper end of the distribution 
than to wage losses at the lower end, and, therefore, cannot be traced directly to the falling 
real value of the minimum wage (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2005).  
 Increases in the minimum wage may lead to losses in hours and employment for low-wage 
individuals. If such losses do take place, increasing the minimum wage will have an 
ambiguous and perhaps slightly negative effect on the earnings and family incomes of low-
wage individuals (Card and Krueger 2000; Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher 2004).   
 
Unionization 
 Lower levels of unionization accounted for 10 to 20 percent of the increase in men’s wage 
inequality in the late 1970s and 1980s (Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux 1996; Card and Krueger 
1995, as cited in Morris and Western 1999). 
 Changes in unionization rates had larger impacts on inequality in the 1970s and 1980s than in 
the 1990s and early 2000s (Bernanke 2007). 
 
This review is divided into two sections. The first considers the mobility consequences of 
changes in minimum wage, and the second focuses on the mobility effects of changes in 
unionization levels. Each section examines the effects of the relevant institution on economic 
growth and absolute mobility, intragenerational mobility, intergenerational mobility, and 
inequality.  
THE MINIMUM WAGE AND ECONOMIC MOBILITY 
 
Minimum Wage and Growth/Absolute Mobility 
Minimum wage laws aim to ensure that low-wage earners do not fall too far behind other 
workers. In theory, it is possible to achieve this goal either by shifting the bottom of the income 
distribution up or by shifting the rest of the income distribution down. Though the former option 
is preferable, it is not clear which to expect. On one hand, it is straightforward to imagine how the 
raising minimum wage could impede economic growth. If employers have to pay more for low-
skill labor, they may employ fewer people and pass their higher costs on to consumers, lowering 
real incomes and slowing overall growth. On the other hand, a higher minimum wage could spark 
growth or at least prove growth-neutral if higher wages push employers to get more out of their 
workers through technological innovation, increased training, or improved efficiency (see, for 
example, Cahuc and Michel, 1996).  
  
The most straightforward empirical work relating changes in the minimum wage to growth rates 
simply compares growth rates before and after changes in the minimum wage or across 
geographical differences in minimum wage levels. Studies of this type tend to find that increases 
in the minimum wage do little to impede growth, and in fact are often associated with high 
growth rates. For instance, the economies of Florida, Washington, and Oregon each grew more 
rapidly than the national economy in the years following state-level minimum wage increases 
(respectively, Schaefer and Nissen (2005); Smith (2003); and OCPP 2005; as cited in Fox 
(2006)). But relying on studies like these to determine causality is to engage in a post hoc ergo 
propter hoc fallacy.  
 
Fortunately, a number of more sophisticated papers consider the impact of the minimum wage on 
employment, which reflects fairly directly on overall growth. Here, different approaches yield 
very different (and very controversial) results. Studies using quasi-experimental datasets to 
analyze state-by-state variation in minimum wage levels find no evidence of employment or 
hours losses. Card and Krueger (1994) surveyed 410 fast food restaurants in New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania before and after a 1992 increase in the New Jersey minimum wage. They found 
that, on average, restaurants in New Jersey added two to three more workers (measured in full-
time-equivalents, or FTEs) over that period than did restaurants in Pennsylvania, indicating that, 
at the very least, raising the New Jersey minimum wage did not reduce employment. Studies 
using data from nationally representative surveys, on the other hand, often show pronounced 
negative effects. For example, Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher (2004) use CPS data to show 
that low-wage workers see their hours decline by an average of about 3 percent in the two years 
following a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage.  
 
Two prominent and relatively recent contributions to this literature are Card and Krueger (2000) 
and Neumark and Wascher (2006), summarized in the table below. Card and Krueger reanalyze 
the 1992 increase in the New Jersey minimum wage using BLS employment data, and find that 
fast food restaurants in New Jersey increased their employment at least as fast as did comparable 
restaurants across the border in Pennsylvania. Just as importantly, Card and Krueger note that 
challenges to their original (1994) study do not hold up well to changes in sample choice and 
model specification. On the opposing side, Neumark and Wascher review 90 studies from 15 
countries, and conclude that the best-executed research (which includes much of their own) 
consistently ties increases in the minimum wage to modest decreases in employment—on the 
order of a 2 percent reduction in employment for every 10 percent increase in the minimum wage.   
 
 
 
Minimum Wage Effects on Economic Growth 
Study (dataset) Methods and Key Results 
Card and Krueger 
2000 (BLS and 
telephone interview 
data on restaurant 
employment in NJ 
and PA.) 
 
o Re-analysis of the effects of the increase in the New Jersey minimum 
wage on fast-food industry employment, using neighboring 
Pennsylvania restaurants as a control group.   
o Following an increase in the New Jersey minimum wage, employment 
increased more quickly in New Jersey than in Pennsylvania. This 
increase was not statistically significant, however. 
o  Though it is possible to obtain results indicating a slower increase in 
New Jersey employment, these depend heavily on the inclusion of 
restaurants owned by a single franchisee and the controls included in 
the regression analysis.  
Neumark and 
Wascher 2006 
(literature review) 
o Qualitative synthesis of literature on the unemployment effects of 
minimum wage. 
o Finds that the majority of the most reliable studies estimate the 
elasticity of employment with respect to changes in the minimum wage 
as between -0.1 and -0.3 for low-skill subgroups. This implies that a 10 
percent increase in the minimum wage will reduce employment by 1 to 
3 percent for teens, young adults, or workers in low-wage sectors.  
 
 
The debate thus boils down to the question of whether the survey or the quasi-experimental 
approach is more appropriate. Each methodology has its critics. The quasi-experimental 
geographic data used by Card and Krueger is open to charges of inaccuracy and irreproducibility, 
but survey data methods may confuse the effects of minimum wage laws with those of other time 
dependent variables. Though the issue is by no means resolved, it may be of relatively little 
importance from a policy perspective. Freeman (1996) characterizes the tussle over the 
unemployment effects of minimum wage as ―a debate of values around zero.‖ In other words, 
though the effects of the minimum wage on employment may be either positive or negative, they 
are certainly modest. In this light, Joseph Stiglitz’ observation that potential repercussions from 
the 1996 increase in the federal minimum wage ―[were] totally swamped by other factors going 
on in the economy‖ (in Chipman 2006) seems apt.  
 
Minimum Wage and Intragenerational Mobility 
Changes in the minimum wage can influence intragenerational mobility in a variety of ways. 
Some of these are straightforward: consistent increases in the minimum wage can ensure that 
low-wage workers who maintain a steady presence in the labor market see their wages rise over 
time. The magnitude of this effect depends on how likely individuals who earn the minimum 
wage at one point in time are to stay at that wage level. If the minimum wage typically represents 
the first step in a quick ascent of the wage scale, increasing it is unlikely to raise mobility above 
some baseline level. If people earning the minimum wage often leave the labor force, or if 
increases in the minimum wage increase the likelihood that they will be forced out, the minimum 
wage will be a similarly ineffective engine of upward mobility.  
 
The minimum wage may also help low-skill workers by altering the incentive structure for 
decisions about labor force participation. If an increase in the minimum wage makes people more 
likely to enter or remain in the labor force, not only will it increase their immediate earnings, it 
will also pay future dividends in the form of returns to experience. Of course, this benefit depends 
directly on the availability of jobs that pay the minimum wage, and so the standard caveat about 
the potential negative impact of the minimum wage on the availability of low-skill employment 
applies here as well.  
 Minimum Wage Effects on Intragenerational Mobility 
Study (dataset) Methods and Key Results 
Smith and 
Vavrichek 1992 
(1984 and 1985 
SIPP panels) 
 
o Descriptive comparisons of outcomes for low-wage workers over time.   
o 63 percent of minimum wage workers saw their wages rise over the 
course of the year. 
o 37 percent of minimum wage workers who were still paid by the hour 
one year later received no wage gains; roughly 50 percent received 
wage gains that did not keep pace with inflation.  
Carrington and 
Fallick 2001 
(NLSY79, CPS 
ORGs 1993 and 
1994) 
o Tabulations of longitudinal wage data by wage category.  
o Minimum wage workers have roughly a 40 to 50 percent chance of 
finding a non-minimum-wage job the following year in each of the first 
10 years of their careers. 
o 15 percent of women and 16 percent of blacks spend at least 5 out of 
the first 10 years of their career at jobs paying close to the minimum 
wage. 
Chaplin, Turner, 
and Pape 2003 
(state minimum 
wage data, 
Common Core of 
Data on public 
school enrollment 
1989-1996) 
o Regression of continuation ratios (current enrollment in grade x 
divided by last year’s enrollment in grade x-1) on state- and school-
level variables, including the local minimum wage.  
o Higher minimum wages exert a negative effect on continuation ratios 
between ninth and tenth grade in states where students are allowed to 
drop out before the age of 18. 
Neumark and 
Nizalova 2004 
(CPS ORGs 1979-
2001) 
o Assembles state-based minimum wage ―histories‖ for each individual, 
distinguishing between exposure at younger and older ages. Computes 
regression estimates of the effects of the average minimum wage over 
these personal histories on wages, earnings, and hours.  
o In general, exposure to higher minimum wage levels decreases future 
(but not current) wages, earnings, and hours. For instance, each 10 
percent increase in the average minimum wage 25- to 29-year-olds 
experienced while they were 20 to 24 decreases their expected current 
weekly earnings by 3.8 percent.  
 
Little direct research on the impacts of minimum wage laws on intragenerational mobility is 
available. The table above summarizes several key findings from this relatively limited body of 
work. One thing is clear: many earners at the very bottom of the wage distribution are essentially 
stuck there. Smith and Vavrichek (1992) and Boushey (2005) point out that roughly a third of 
minimum wage workers who remain employed do not see their incomes increase over time 
periods of up to three years. Along similar lines, Carrington and Fallick (2001) find that 
approximately 15 percent of women and 16 percent of blacks spend at least 5 out of the first 10 
years of their career at jobs paying close to the minimum wage. So, all things being equal, an 
increase in the minimum wage seems likely to lead to real upward mobility for a substantial 
minority of workers. At the same time, a majority of workers do see their wages rise above the 
minimum, and many other minimum wage workers leave the workforce or become unemployed. 
Smith and Vavrichek, for example, put the latter number at 27 percent over one year. These 
workers are less likely to benefit from an increase in the minimum wage, and may even be hurt 
by it if it raises the hurdles to labor force entry.  
 
Evidence on the incentive effects of increases in the minimum wage is even murkier. Studies of 
the employment and hours effects of minimum wage laws touch on the issue tangentially; i.e., if 
increasing the minimum wage results in the employment of more low-skill workers, an increased 
incentive to work could be construed as one of the causes. Katz and Krueger (1992) and Card and 
Krueger (1994) do indeed find that increasing the minimum wage has a modestly positive effect 
on employment, but a series of studies by Neumark and Wascher find the opposite. For more 
detail, see the Minimum Wage and Growth/Absolute Mobility section above. In any case, 
confounding factors like changes in the availability of low-skill work limit the usefulness of this 
research for the study of incentive effects.  
 
Other studies address the issue of incentives more directly, analyzing the impact of minimum 
wage laws on the choice between work and welfare. Pavetti (1993) presents results indicating that 
some women want to leave welfare for the workforce, but find the costs associated with 
employment too steep. Both Turner and Bicakova (2003) and Page, Spetz, and Millar (1998) seek 
to resolve the opposing tugs of increased incentives and (potential) decreased opportunity 
empirically. Turner and Bicakova use PSID data from for the years 1979–1992 and find that a 10 
percent increase in the minimum wage increases the likelihood of a welfare exit by 7.8 percent 
for short-term welfare recipients and 15.7 percent for long-term welfare recipients. Page, Spetz, 
and Millar use CPS data from the year 1983–1996, and peg the elasticity of the welfare caseload 
with respect to the minimum wage at 0.15, implying that a 10 percent increase in the minimum 
wage will lead to a 1.5 percent increase in the welfare caseload.  
 
Shifting the focus from the tradeoffs between welfare and work to the tradeoffs between 
education and work, Chaplin et al. (2003) find that higher minimum wages may reduce school 
enrollment in states that allow students to leave school before the age of 18. This finding 
underscores the potentially powerful incentive effects of the minimum wage, but also introduces a 
level of normative ambiguity: while policymakers would like to make the transition from welfare 
to work more attractive, they would prefer not to increase the immediate rewards available to 
people who drop out of high school. Research on the incentive effects of increases in the 
minimum wage has yet to converge. 
 
Minimum Wage and Intergenerational Mobility 
The intergenerational impacts of minimum wage laws have seen precious little study. In theory, 
such impacts depend on the interaction between the growth and inequality effects of minimum 
wage laws. If increasing the minimum wage decreases inequality without lessening overall 
growth, the children of individuals at the low end of the income distribution will likely have 
better chances of economic success than they would have without policy intervention. If 
minimum wage laws decrease inequality but dampen growth in a given generation, it is likely that 
individuals in the next generation will be more equal in terms of relative opportunity but perhaps 
less able to advance beyond current levels of well-being. And, of course, if minimum wage 
statutes limit growth while failing to reduce inequality, both relative and absolute 
intergenerational mobility will likely suffer.  
 
The research discussed above indicates that, historically, the impact of minimum wage laws on 
economic growth has been negligible. The suggestion that modest changes in the minimum wage 
will greatly depress absolute mobility rates therefore seems implausible. But, as is discussed in 
the Minimum Wage and Economic Inequality section, it is unclear that minimum wage laws 
have succeeded in lessening earnings and income inequality, even in the short term. This fact 
places arguments over the intergenerational impacts of the minimum wage squarely in the realm 
of speculation. 
 
Minimum Wage and Economic Inequality 
In theory, increases in the minimum wage improve the relative position of workers at the bottom 
of the wage spectrum, whether through mandated pay hikes for people earning wages below the 
new minimum or through so-called ripple effects, in which employers raise the wages of 
employees earning just above the minimum wage as well. But these benefits come with a 
potential cost: if employers are forced to pay more for each hour of labor, they may decide to pay 
for fewer hours, limiting the earnings of their employees and making it more difficult for 
unemployed low-skill workers to find jobs. If these effects on employment and hours are of 
sufficient magnitude, increases in the minimum wage could prove a net loss for low-income 
workers, and raise overall levels of income inequality. Motivated by this simple model, 
researchers have devoted much empirical energy to assessing the size and significance of the 
benefits and the costs of increases in the minimum wage. The table below summarizes several of 
the more important recent studies. 
 
Minimum Wage Effects on Wage, Earnings, and Income Distributions 
Study (dataset) Methods and Key Results 
Dinardo, Fortin and 
Lemieux 1996 
(1979-1992 CPS 
ORGs, 1973-1978 
May Supplements) 
 
o Reweights 1988 sample to match 1979 sample in terms of various 
worker characteristics.  
o Minimum wage explains 25 percent of increase in standard deviation 
of men’s log wages, 30 percent of increase in standard deviation of 
women’s log wages. 
o For comparison: unionization rates and ―individual attributes‖ each 
accounted for about 15 percent of the increase in the standard 
deviation of men’s wages. 
Neumark, 
Schweitzer, and 
Wascher 2004 
(1979-97 CPS 
ORGs) 
o Examines the wage, hours, and earnings responses to a 10 percent 
increase in the minimum wage at various points in the wage 
distribution.  
o Near the minimum wage, a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage 
leads to about a 4 percent increase in wages, but about a 3 percent 
reduction in hours over two years and a 1 to 2 percent reduction in 
employment over one year. Earned income declines by about 6 percent 
over two years.  
Neumark, 
Schweitzer, and 
Wascher 2005 
(matched CPS 
1986-1995) 
 
o Difference-in-difference estimates of densities at various points in the 
income/needs distribution.  
o Finds that a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage increases the 
number of poor/near poor individuals by about 4 percent. Most of these 
individuals seem to begin with income/needs ratios between 1.5 and 3; 
higher income groups remain relatively unaffected.  
 
These studies seek to assess the inequality impacts of the minimum wage directly. In each case, 
the authors measure inequality by examining changes in the income, earnings, and wage 
distributions over time, and employ a regression framework to relate these changes to changes in 
the minimum wage. Using such techniques, researchers focusing on inequality in the wage 
distribution generally find that raising the minimum wage produces large, positive effects, while 
those investigating the distribution of income or earnings tend to find modest impacts at most. An 
alternative approach concentrates on quantifying the negative effects of increases in the minimum 
wage on employment and hours. If these effects are positive or close to zero, increasing the 
minimum wage will likely prove a net benefit for low-income workers and thus reduce overall 
inequality. Findings here are extremely controversial: some authors report that raising the 
minimum wage reduces low-wage employment, while others observe the opposite effect. This 
debate is discussed in more detail in the Minimum Wage and Growth/Absolute Mobility 
section.  
 
Wage inequality. A broad consensus holds that, at least in the 1980s, higher minimum wages 
tended to reduce wage inequality. Fortin and Lemieux (1997) use a straightforward visual 
comparison of wage distributions from 1979 and 1988 to show that the higher real minimum 
wage in 1979 produced a ―spike‖ in the wage distribution at the minimum level. As the real value 
of the minimum wage declined, the low end of the wage distribution expanded downwards, 
increasing inequality. Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) conduct a more formal analysis over 
the same time period, reweighting the 1988 wage distribution to match demographic and labor 
market characteristics from prior years. The authors find that the minimum wage explains up 25 
percent of the increase in the standard deviation of men’s log wages, and up to 30 percent of the 
increase in the standard deviation of women’s log wages. Card and Krueger (1995) offer a similar 
estimate, arguing that the 1990 increase in the minimum wage reduced wage inequality by about 
30 percent. Each of these papers uses data from CPS outgoing rotation groups, which, along with 
the CPS March Supplement, make up what in practice amounts to an industry standard dataset for 
minimum wage research. 
 
Researchers have been more hesitant to associate minimum wage laws with recent changes in 
wage inequality. Indeed, some argue that wage inequality in the bottom half of the distribution—
the portion of the distribution most directly affected by minimum wage laws—has held relatively 
flat since the late 1980s (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2006; Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2005).  
 
Earnings and income inequality. Wages, of course, are at best a crude measure of economic 
status, and at worst may be a misleading one, if, for instance, increases in wages correspond to 
decreases in hours worked or job loss. With this in mind, researchers have focused much recent 
attention on the reaction of the earnings and income distributions to changes in the minimum 
wage. The findings here are mixed. On one hand, most research based on national surveys holds 
that increases in the minimum wage have no significant effect on inequality. Horrigan and Mincy 
(1993) use CPS data from 1981 and 1988 to simulate the effect of changes in the minimum wage 
on the share of earnings in each earnings quintile, and find no substantial impacts. Neumark, 
Schweitzer, and Wascher (2004) do not deal explicitly with inequality, but find that low-wage 
workers actually suffer earnings losses within two years after changes in the minimum wage. 
Family incomes seem to react similarly to changes in the minimum wage. Using CPS data, 
Neumark, Schweitzer, and Wascher (2005) find that, once lagged effects are taken into account, 
increases in the minimum wage tend to push some near-poor people into poverty while leaving 
the upper end of the income distribution relatively untouched. 
 
But findings from quasi-experimental research by Card and Krueger (1994) dispute the 
contention that minimum wage increases lead to reductions in hours and employment for low-
wage workers. Though vociferously challenged, these results remain relatively intact (see Card 
and Krueger 2000). As discussed in the Minimum Wage and Growth/Absolute Mobility 
section, the apparent discrepancy between these results and those of Neumark and Wascher can 
be traced to methodological differences that have yet to be resolved. Within this vein of research, 
then, the general consensus holds that increases in the minimum wage decrease wage inequality. 
However, because raising the minimum wage may also create modest job and hours losses, its 
effect on income and earnings inequality remains unclear.  
UNIONS AND ECONOMIC MOBILITY 
 
Unions and Growth/Absolute Mobility 
As with the minimum wage, the ability of unions to reduce inequality is of little interest if they do 
so by crippling the economy in general. In other words, to get an accurate of idea of impact of 
unions on absolute mobility, one must consider their relationship to economic growth. Although 
classical economic theory holds that unions raise wages above competitively set levels and thus 
decrease productivity, the last 20 years have seen a shift towards a more nuanced theoretical 
framework in which unions can have either positive or negative effects on productivity. Freeman 
and Medoff (1984) gave early voice to this duality by differentiating between the ―two faces‖ of 
union behavior. In their monopoly face, unions behave according to the classical model, raising 
wages to artificial levels and functioning as taxes on investments in future productivity. In their 
collective voice face, however, unions may improve productivity by allowing for more effective 
communication between workers and management. With the clout of a union behind them, 
workers may have an easier time passing suggestions for improved workplace practices along to 
management. Unions also provide workers with a means to express discontent without quitting or 
resorting to absenteeism, thus reducing turnover and increasing productivity. Empirical results are 
consistent with the idea that unions perform both of these functions. The table below highlights 
several key results. 
 
Union Effects on Economic Growth 
Study (dataset) Methods and Key Results 
Doucouliagos and 
Laroche 2003 
(quantitative meta-
analysis) 
o Metaregression of the effects of unions on productivity using data from 
73 statistically independent studies. 
o 45 studies found a positive relationship between unionization and 
productivity, and 28 found a negative relationship 
o Controlling for differences in specifications, unionization appears to 
have slightly positive affect on productivity in the U.S. in general and 
U.S. manufacturing in particular, but a negative affect on U.K. 
productivity.  
Hirsch, 
MacPherson, and 
Schumacher 2004 
(CPS and 
ECI/ECEC portion 
of the National 
Compensation 
Survey 1986-2001) 
o Compares trends in the gap between union and non-union wages 
produced by various datasets using a regression framework.   
o Findings: CPS and ECI data estimate the union wage gap decreased by 
approximately 10–12 percent between 1986 and 2001. ECEC data 
indicates the wage gap grew slightly.  
o Authors place more stock in the CPS/ECI findings.  
Lewin 2005 
(qualitative 
literature review) 
 
o Reviews literature on the changes in worker turnover associated with 
unionization. 
o Most researchers agree that unionization significantly lowers quit rates; 
estimates of the size of this effect range from 31 percent to 65 percent.  
 
Evidence of the monopoly face can be found in the persistence of a wage gap between union and 
non-union workers: union workers are typically paid more than non-union workers for similar 
jobs. However, the size of this wage gap appears to have decreased over time. Blanchflower and 
Bryson (2004) compare private sector union/non-union wage gaps calculated using 1974–1979 
May CPS files to wage gaps calculated using 1996–2001 matched CPS ORGs. They find that 
union workers in the 1974–1979 sample typically made about 21 percent more than non-union 
workers, compared to 17 percent more between 1996 and 2001. Hirsch, MacPherson, and 
Schumacher (2004) assess changes in the private sector union wage gap between 1986 and 2001 
using a variety of datasets (the CPS, and the ECI/ECEC portion of the National Compensation 
Survey). Though they highlight the discrepancies between results from the different datasets, 
these authors prefer estimates from the CPS and ECI that place the decline in the size of the wage 
gap between union and non-union workers at roughly 10 percentage points.  
 
Unions also appear to reduce turnover and absenteeism, as the collective voice model predicts. 
For instance, Addison and Belfield (2004) use workplace- and individual-level data from the 
1998 British Workplace Employer Relations Survey to find that unions reduce quit rates by 34 
percent. Lewin (2005) reviews the literature on the subject, and cites estimates of quit rate 
reductions that range from 31 to 65 percent. (It should be noted, however, that Lewin disputes 
Freeman and Medoff’s claims that unions allow employees to resolve grievances more 
effectively.)  
 
The net effects of unionization on productivity are ambiguous and highly controversial. 
Doucouliagos and Laroche (2003) review 73 articles on the union productivity effect. Of these, 
45 found a positive relationship between unionization and productivity, and 28 found a negative 
relationship. A meta-regression indicates that most of the differences between these studies were 
attributable to variations in model specification, and that, controlling for these differences, unions 
had a generally positive impact on U.S. productivity. Clearly, though, the jury is still out on this 
matter.  
 
And even if one accepts a given conclusion about the effects of unions on present-day 
productivity, there are further complications to consider. Freeman and Kleiner (1999) and 
Dinardo and Lee (2004) find that unions may lower employment growth without increasing the 
risk of plant or firm closure, suggesting that unions reduce investment in future growth without 
affecting current productivity. A number of authors frame unions’ negative effect on investment 
in terms of a tax; i.e., unionized firms may be less likely to make a given investment than non-
unionized firms because they can expect to pay a ―tax‖ on the returns to that investment in the 
form of higher wages. For instance, Fallick and Hassett (1999) assess changes in firms’ 
investment patterns following union certification elections between 1962 and 1984, and find that 
the effects of unionization on the average ratio of investment to capital are similar to those of a 30 
percentage point increase in the corporate income tax rate. Menezes-Filho and van Reenen (2003) 
review more than 40 relevant studies and reach a similar conclusion, arguing that, in the United 
States, unionization tends to decrease investment in research and development. They also find a 
smaller but still noticeable negative effect on productivity growth.  
 
As a rejoinder to this line of research, Freeman (2005) posits that unions may balance out the 
reduction in firm-level investments by encouraging workers to save. In the 1979 CPS, 83 percent 
of union workers were covered by a pension plan, compared to 39 percent of non-union workers. 
This gap persisted through the 2002 CPS, in which 76 percent of workers covered by union 
contracts reported pension coverage, compared to 46 percent of other workers. Since savings and 
investment rates are closely related at the national level, Freeman argues, this may be a pathway 
through which unionization increases investment. Here again, then, research remains unsettled—
although negative effects of unions on firm investment are much better documented than 
Freeman’s proposed link between unions and aggregated national investment.   
   
Another strand of literature concerns the optimum level of unionization. It is possible, on the one 
hand, that the productivity benefits of unions arise from competition between union and non-
union firms. On the other, researchers have argued that unions negotiating on behalf of some 
workers and not others may promote policies that benefit their clients at the expense of the overall 
economy. If, as these theories hold, the rate of unionization plays a role in determining the 
productivity effects of unionization, the effects of policies aimed at promoting or discouraging 
unionization become increasingly difficult to assess. Imagine a situation in which productivity 
benefits from competition between union and non-union firms. If the unionization rate increases 
beyond some competitively optimal level, productivity could decrease even if unions raised 
productivity prior to the uptick in unionization. Pencavel (2005) reviews the pertinent literature, 
which typically focuses on international comparisons of the relationship between bargaining 
regimes and productivity. He characterizes this work as ―fickle‖ and argues that it has produced 
―few robust results.‖ The reasons for this, Pencavel continues, include very small sample sizes 
(typically on the order of 20 countries) and a lack of consensus regarding the measurement of 
bargaining systems.  
 
On the whole, it appears that unionization at its current level has a small but perhaps slightly 
positive effect on U.S. productivity at a given point in time. Over the long run, however, 
unionization may dampen growth by lowering the incentive for unionized firms to make 
investments aimed at enhancing future productivity. Moreover, it is possible that each of these 
outcomes depends on a particular level and type of unionization. That is, as unionization rates and 
union bargaining strategies change, union effects may change as well. 
 
Union Membership and Intragenerational Mobility 
The potential impact of union membership on intragenerational mobility is double-edged. On the 
one hand, unions may be able to use their negotiating power to assure workers higher wages and 
steady gains over time. On the other, because unions tend to favor seniority over productivity, 
highly skilled workers may be less able to achieve large wage increases.  
 
 
 
Union Membership’s Effects on Intragenerational Mobility 
Study (dataset) Methods and Key Results 
Wunnava and 
Okkunade 1996 
(PSID 1981-1989) 
o Regressions of wage levels on longitudinal measures of union status 
and current and one- and two-period lagged unemployment rates.  
o The cumulative effect of unemployment on the wages of non-union 
individuals was -0.6 percent, but unemployment did not affect union 
wages.  
McCue 1996 (PSID 
1976-1988) 
 
o Hazard model of the probability that workers will receive a promotion, 
with union status included among the covariates.  
o For white men, union membership lowers the annual probability of 
promotion by 23–32 percent, depending on model specification. 
o For comparison: not having a high school degree lowered the annual 
risk of promotion for white men by 37–48 percent.  
 
The seminal finding regarding the links between unions and intra-generational mobility is that the 
age-earnings profiles of union members are flatter but higher than those of non-union workers. 
That is, union workers typically make more than non-union workers, but their earnings increase 
less with age (Lazear 1979). This conforms to both the positive and negative predictions about 
union impacts.  
 
Research comparing the finer-grain dynamics of earnings and wage mobility for union and non-
union workers is much rarer. Extant findings, however, also tend to confirm that unions increase 
wage levels and stability. For instance, Wunnava and Okkunade (1996) uses PSID data for the 
years 1981–1989 to examine the impacts of unemployment on the wages of union and non-union 
workers. They find that union membership decreases the size of wage losses following periods of 
high unemployment: while the long-term effect of unemployment on the non-union wages of 
people in their sample was -0.6 percent, unemployment did not significantly affect the wages of 
union members. Card (1996) explores the mobility consequences of union entry and exit. Using 
statistically matched data from the 1987 and 1988 CPS ORGs, he finds that wages typically 
increase by 6 percent upon union entry, with the largest gains accruing to low-skill individuals. 
Along similar lines, wages decline steeply for low-skill individuals who leave unions. Though 
Card cautions that some of the variation across skill groups may be due problems in the 
measurement of union status, his broader conclusions—that union entry increases wages and 
union exit decreases wages—hold even after controlling for potential error.  
 
These advantages, however, do come at the cost of decreased upward mobility. McCue (1996) 
uses PSID data from 1976–1988 to estimate a hazard model of the probability of workplace 
promotion. She finds that, for white men, union membership lowers the annual probability of 
promotion by 23 to 32 percent, depending on model specification. Additionally, union 
membership lowers the returns to additional education, and plays a significant role in determining 
overall promotion rates within racial groups: black men are more likely than white men to be 
union members, and, as a consequence, are less likely to receive promotions.  
 
Union Membership and Intergenerational Mobility 
The theoretical connections between union membership and intergenerational mobility are quite 
strong. Because, ceteris paribus, union members tend to earn more than other workers, and 
income levels tend to persist from generation to generation, children with parents who are union 
members could be expected to have higher incomes than demographically equivalent children 
with non-union parents. The social consequences of union membership may also be beneficial 
over multiple generations. Children with parents who have union connections may enjoy 
increased community support while growing up, or improved access to union work as adults. 
 
Each of these positive effects results from parents’ ability to pass along the perks of their union 
status to their children. Though such behaviors may increase absolute intergenerational mobility, 
the likely cost is an increase in social rigidity; i.e., decreasing relative intergenerational mobility. 
This could prove particularly problematic for low-skill, non-union workers, who stand to lose out 
if employers or social institutions favor their unionized peers. Clearly, this subject cannot be 
parsed thoroughly without an empirical investigation. But studies examining the intergenerational 
effects of union membership are few and far between.  
 
Shea (1997) is one of the few authors to directly consider the effects of union membership on 
intergenerational outcomes. With the goal of separating the effects of income from those of 
unobserved characteristics correlated with income, Shea considers the impact of parents’ union 
membership on children’s wages, earnings, and years of schooling. The underlying hypothesis is 
that union membership represents a financial boon that is uncorrelated with unobservable skills. 
Using PSID data, Shea finds that low-income children whose parents are union members tend to 
do better than their counterparts whose parents reported similar observables but were not union 
members. This finding does not hold for the fully representative sample, and, just as importantly, 
does not reflect on the impact of unionization on societal mobility. But Shea’s results are, at the 
very least, suggestive: parents’ union membership translates into better outcomes for children. 
Blanden and Machin (2003) suggest that one of the mechanisms driving this effect may be the 
intergenerational transmission of union membership itself. Using British BHPS data for the years 
1993 to 1998, the authors find that young adults with fathers who are union members are nearly 
twice as likely as young adults without union fathers to be union members themselves (21 percent 
to 12 percent). Neither Shea nor Blanden and Machin sheds much light on the broader 
intergenerational effects of labor unions, but, taken together, they do suggest that the financial 
and social aspects of union membership are both moderately heritable.  
 
Union Membership and Economic Inequality 
Unions offer workers a powerful tool with which to capture profits from owners and 
shareholders. The advantages of unionized negotiating are likely to be particularly pronounced 
for workers trying to capture value that does not depend directly on labor, like returns to capital 
or windfall profits. Taken at face value, the shift of income from employers to employees equates 
to a tightening of the income distribution. Because they tend to confine workers to standard pay 
schedules, unions may further reduce inequality by tightening income distributions within 
occupation categories. But unions may produce other, less desirable effects. For instance, unions 
may discourage employers from expanding their payrolls, potentially raising overall 
unemployment levels and discouraging long-term growth. The net effect of unions on inequality 
must therefore be resolved empirically. Many researchers have attempted to do so, often with a 
particular emphasis on wage inequality. The table below summarizes several important studies.  
 
Unions’ Effects on Wage Inequality 
Study (dataset) Methods and Key Results 
Freeman 1993 
(1978 and 1988 
March CPS) 
 
o Decomposes the variance impacts of unions on the white-collar/blue-
collar wage gap, the blue collar wage gap within unionized industries, 
and the wage gap between union and non-union workers. 
o Findings: decrease in union density responsible for roughly 20 
percent of the increase in the dispersion of the natural log of men’s 
earnings. 
Card, Lemieux, and 
Riddell 2004 (US: 
1973, 1974, 1984, 
1993, 2001 CPS 
ORGs.UK: 1983 
GHS, 1993 and 
2001 UKLFS. 
Canada: CLFS) 
 
o Compares changing rates of unionization in U.S., U.K., and Canada to 
increasing wage inequality. 
o Findings: deunionization responsible for about 14 percent of increase 
in wage inequality in the United States between 1973 and 2001.  
o For comparison: deunionization responsible for between 9 percent and 
29 percent of growth in U.K. inequality between 1983 and 2001; 
inequality did not grow in Canada between 1984 and the early 2000s.  
Dinardo, Fortin and 
Lemieux 1996 
(1979-1992 CPS 
ORGs, 1973-1978 
May Supplements) 
 
o Reweights 1988 sample to match 1979 sample in terms of various 
worker characteristics.  
o Unionization rates and ―individual attributes‖ each accounted for about 
15 percent of the increase in the standard deviation of men’s wages. 
o For comparison: minimum wage explains 25 percent of increase in 
standard deviation of men’s log wages, 30 percent of increase in 
standard deviation of women’s log wages. 
 
Freeman (1993) lays out the basic terms of inequality decomposition, using CPS data from 1978 
and 1988 to decompose union-related earnings variance into three components: (1) the change in 
white-collar, blue-collar differential, (2) the decrease in earnings inequality within unionized 
blue-collar workers, and (3) the earnings gap between union and non-union workers. These 
correspond, in order, to the interactions between unionization and income inequality described in 
the preceding paragraph. In total, Freeman estimates that the decrease in unionization is 
responsible for roughly 20 percent of the increase in the standard deviation of log male earnings. 
Dinardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) employ the reweighting techniques described here and 
conclude that deunionization explained roughly 10 percent of the increase in wage inequality 
between 1979 and 1988. (The same study found that changes in the minimum wage explained 25 
to 30 percent of the increase.) Card (2001) reports similar results, as do Card, Lemieux and 
Riddell (2004). In a review of 20 years of research, Freeman (2005) characterizes the inequality-
reducing effect of unionization on wages as ―robust across time, models, and data.‖ 
 
Though robust, this effect is not uniform. Unionization levels vary widely across employment 
sector, skill level, and gender, and the impact unions have on wage inequality also varies along 
these dimensions. Card (2001) assesses union wage gaps across skill deciles, finding that union 
participation for men follows an ―inverted U‖ shape across skill deciles; i.e., moderately-skilled 
men are the most likely to join unions. Unionization tends to compress the distribution of payoffs 
for skill: Card finds that unions exert positive pressure on wages at the lower end of the skill 
spectrum, and negative pressure at the top. Other studies use more sophisticated methods that 
allow for differences in unobserved skill between union members and non-union workers, a 
modeling choice motivated by the perception that union members may bring more intangibles—
like trade-specific expertise—to the bargaining table. Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2004) estimate 
such a model and report similar results. Summarizing the available literature, Katz and Autor 
(1999) describe how ―the concentration of deunionization on the less-educated contributed to the 
enormous increase in educational wage differentials and overall male wage inequality in the 
1980s.‖  
 
Card (2001) also finds large differences between union impacts in the public and private sector—
between 1973 and 1993, the public sector became increasingly unionized, while private sector 
unionization rates decreased. Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2004) extend this work through the 
1990s, and attribute 50 to 80 percent of the slower inequality growth in the public sector (as 
compared to the private sector) to the disparate trends in unionization.  
 
Differences in trends in and effects of unionization vary by gender as well. Fortin and Lemieux 
(1997) find that men are much more likely than women to be in a union, and that unionization 
only has significant inequality reducing effects on men’s wages. Card, Lemieux, and Riddell 
(2004) go further, arguing that unionization actually has a disequalizing effect on women’s 
wages. In any case, it is clear that the equalizing effects of unionization come primarily as a result 
of changes in the distribution of men’s wages.  
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